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Abstract
Constitutional limits on government’s power to regulate the culture and the arts,
newly salient in light of the controversy involving the Brooklyn Museum, are best
understood by distinguishing among (a) content-neutral, (b) content-based, and (c)
viewpoint-based restrictions, and also among (a) criminal and civil sanctions, (b)
“penalties,” and (c) mere failure to fund. The resulting three-by-three matrix provides an
understanding of the vast bulk of current constitutional law. At the same time, several
serious puzzles are created by current law: the distinction between viewpoint
discrimination and content discrimination can be thin in the context of art; it is hard to
know what counts as a “mere” failure to fund; and the law contains important
uncertainties about selective funding. There is discussion as well of government subsidies
of the market for culture and art.
Government devotes a great deal of money to the promotion of culture. With
taxpayer money, the government supports artists, writers, musicians, and private
institutions, including museums. But government must be selective; it cannot support all
artists, or all museums, all of the time. With respect to culture, what are the limits on
government’s power? When may government impose criminal or civil restraints, or
withdraw benefits, or refuse to fund? These issues have become especially salient in light
of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s effort to withdraw funding from the Brooklyn Museum, an
effort growing out of his disapproval of the Museum’s controversial decision to display
the show “Sensation.”
In this essay I attempt to clarify the first amendment issues, principally by
exploiting two sets of distinctions. The first is the distinction among 1) criminal and civil
remedies, 2) penalties, and 3) “mere” failures to fund. The second is the distinction
among 1) viewpoint-based rules, 2) viewpoint-neutral but content-based rules, and 3)
content-neutral rules. For present purposes, the first set of distinctions should be
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sufficiently clear. The second set of distinctions is designed to separate rules that aim at
the speaker’s viewpoint (“no one may receive funding whose work opposes Christian
theology”) from rules that aim at content but not viewpoint (“no one may receive funding
unless their work deals with World War II”), and both from rules that do not turn at all on
content (“no museum in New York may receive funding unless private donations are
under $100,000 per year”).
To get ahead of the story, and putting some qualifications and complexities to one
side, the resulting set of constitutional principles looks like this:
Viewpoint-based Viewpoint-neutral,
but content-based
Content-neutral
Criminal/civil unconstitutional Unconstitutional Depends on
outcome of a
balancing test
Penalties Unconstitutional
(the Brooklyn
Museum case)
Probably
unconstitutional
Depends on
outcome of a
balancing test
Mere failure to fund Should be and
probably is
unconstitutional (?)
Probably
constitutional
(unless there is
hidden viewpoint
discrimination)
Almost certainly
constitutional
The essay comes in four parts. Part I deals briefly with the simplest question,
involving criminal and civil remedies imposed on art. Part II shifts to the general question
of government largesse.  After providing a brief treatment of government subsidy of
culture, Part II explores the topic of “penalties.” Part III investigates the idea of a “mere
failure to fund.” Part IV is a conclusion, with some observations about first amendment
law in this context.
I.  Criminal and Civil Remedies
The term “censorship” is a loaded and sometimes contested term, but it is usually
taken to include any effort to impose criminal sanctions on speech.  If the government
seeks to criminalize private speech, including art, it faces an extremely heavy burden.
Here the question is whether government can fit the speech at issue within the
conventional categories of regulable speech, most prominently libel, incitement (“clear
and present danger”), commercial speech, and obscenity. These are emphatically narrow
categories.
1 To show incitement, for example, government must demonstrate that the
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speech at hand is both directed to incite, and likely to incite, imminent lawless action.
2 It
is hard to imagine artistic works that would be regulable under this standard.
Notwithstanding the continuing controversy over whether “obscenity” should be
regulable at all, it is clear that museums and artists have little to fear from the Supreme
Court’s understanding of the constitutional standard. It was obvious, for example, that
Robert Mapplethorpe’s work  could not lawfully be counted as obscene, and his ultimate
vindication in court was no surprise to informed observers.
Though the law could have gone otherwise,
3 what is true for criminal sanctions is
equally true for civil remedies. If government authorizes a public enforcement official to
collect civil fines for objectionable speech, or if it grants a right of recovery in tort to
private litigants, it must meet the ordinary constitutional standards. It will be
exceptionally difficult to meet this burden.
There is one qualification to the discussion thus far: Content-neutral restrictions
on speech meet a lower standard, one that involves a degree of balancing.
4 The balancing
requires an inquiry into the extent of the intrusion on the speech and the legitimacy and
strength of the government’s justification for the intrusion. If, for example, government
says that people may not use loudspeakers on the public streets after midnight, or may not
engage in protected expression on private property, there is unlikely to be a legitimate
constitutional complaint. The intrusion in speech is minimal and the government has
good reason to protect people from loud noises on the streets after midnight.
For the most part, however, this qualification  is irrelevant to government control
of art and museums: What would a content-neutral restriction look like in this context?
We could imagine, perhaps, a performance artist who sought to defy generally applicable
prohibitions on nudity in public places, and here there would be a genuine constitutional
issue, with reasonable arguments both ways. But in general, criminal and civil remedies,
in this setting, are likely to be based on the content of speech, and as such those remedies
are overwhelmingly likely to be unconstitutional.
II.  Penalties
The discussion thus far involved the simplest and most conventional first
amendment cases. Shift now shift to a somewhat more complicated issue, arising
whenever government attempts to eliminate “benefits” for those who have engaged in
expressive activity of which government disapproves. These are cases involving what the
complaining party would like to treat as “penalties” on constitutionally protected activity.
The topic, then, is government withdrawal of subsidies.
5
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To understand this problem, it is necessary to have some understanding of why,
exactly, government subsidizes art and culture. As a matter of political reality, the answer
lies partly in the self-interest of politicians and the electoral power wielded by people
who want government to do exactly this. But there are arguments, and not merely power,
involved here. First, art, music, and other cultural products often have a range of external
benefits, and those benefits may not be adequately captured by artists and musicians; a
government supplement may help to ensure an optimal level of protection. Second,  the
private market for culture may come with its own strings attached, and it is possible that
private funding would ensure underproduction of art that is in some sense novel, unusual,
or subversive. (Of course there is no assurance that public funding will sponsor such art.)
Third, cultural products are desirable precisely because they are widely shared goods, and
help to constitute a culture, providing a kind of social glue. A public museum, or a
publicly sponsored celebration of one or another sort, may have exactly this function,
which cannot easily be provided through the private sector. Consider, as possible
examples, the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, DC, and the famous “cows”
exhibits throughout Chicago in the fall of 1999.
 With this background, let us define “penalties’ as the denial of benefits that
would have been conferred if not for speech to which government objects. In the ordinary
refrain, these are “penalties” on the exercise of what is claimed to be a constitutional
right. Consider some easy cases from other contexts. A welfare recipient speaks out
against the Mayor; welfare benefits are promptly withdrawn. A low-level government
employee attends meetings for the Conservative Coalition; she is fired as a result.
Someone with a government grant for scientific research turns out to be a member of the
Socialist Party; when public officials learn about this fact, they withdraw the grant. In all
of these cases, the first amendment has been violated. The government has used its power
of “largesse” to punish the exercise of constitutional rights, by denying people benefits to
which they would otherwise have been entitled, and by basing the denial on the exercise
of constitutional rights.
What does this mean in the cultural context? It means that government cannot
withdraw, from a museum or artist, benefits to which either would be entitled, if the
reason for the withdrawal  is expression that is not independently punishable under the
First Amendment. Suppose, for example, that government is leasing public property to a
museum, but that in response to an exhibit to which government has objections,
government cancels the release, or refuses to renew it (when it otherwise would). This is
clearly a penalty, and therefore constitutionally unacceptable.  This point is largely
sufficient to resolve the problems raised by Mayor Giuliani’s effort to withdraw funds
from the Brooklyn Museum as a result of a controversial and perhaps offensive exhibit.
The best argument on behalf of the Mayor would be that he attempted a “mere” failure to
fund (see below). But the facts reveal a penalty (on what would otherwise be the city’s
course of action), not a mere failure to fund. The reason is that Mayor Giuliani proposed,
not merely to deny funding to the exhibit in question, but to withdraw funds that had
antecedently been committed to the Museum. There is an important general lesson here
about government’s power to condition continued benefits on adherence to the
government’s preferred views about speech content.5
A content-neutral penalty would be in a different category. Suppose, for example,
that government finds it necessary to use buildings formerly leased to museums for other
purposes, such as military functions or prisons. If so, there is unlikely to be a serious first
amendment question. The best challenge would suggest that there is no good reason for
the decision not to use the relevant buildings as an outlet for expression – that the shift
from expressive to other purposes fails any sensible “balancing test.” This would be an
uphill battle for plaintiffs, but the basic analysis is straightforward: It involves an
assessment of the the strength and legitimacy of the government’s purposes, as compared
with the burden on expressive activity. This is an analysis that is likely to lead courts to
validate content-neutral measures that might otherwise count as objectionable penalties.
III. Failure to Fund
When government is simply refusing to fund, its power is at the apex. In funding
artistic work, government is inevitably selective, and if it is going to be selective, it is
certainly permitted to make distinctions on the basis of content. Indeed, that is what
selectivity means in this context. Content discrimination is inevitable. But there are many
wrinkles here. They are best explored through distinguishing among a series of cases,
actual and imaginable.
1. Discrimination among artists, without discrimination on grounds of content.
Suppose that the government is funding private museums, on a per-exhibit basis. Suppose
that it decides that for a certain year, it will provide funding only to projects that are done
by American artists. It does this on the ground that it wants to support “domestic art.”
There should be no constitutional problem with this decision. The government has a
legitimate interest in funding American artists, and discrimination of this sort does not
favor or disfavor any point of view, or indeed favor or disfavor any subject matter or
speech of any particular content. To be sure, there might be some indirect connection
between American citizenship and artistic content, and the first amendment problem
would be heightened if the discrimination were conspicuously responsive to speech of a
disfavored content.
6 But in the absence of clear evidence of an implicit effort to regulate
viewpoints, discrimination among artists is entirely acceptable.
This view seems to follow from Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Washington,
7 where the Court upheld a statute that allowed veteran’s organizations, but
no other organizations, to deduct political contributions even if a substantial part of their
activities were devoted to attempts to influence legislation. The Court emphasized that
this distinction was not an effort to aim at the suppression of ideas, and that government
could reasonably reward veterans in this way. The decision suggests that discrimination
among artists should be generally be acceptable, so long as the discrimination is not a
“cover” for viewpoint discrimination. Note that from this conclusion it does not follow
that government could reserve funding to those who believe in God or who are prepared
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to vote for the Republican party. Efforts of this kind should be invalidated on the ground
that they amount to a form of implicit viewpoint discrimination, against both art
(indirectly) and artists (directly).
2. Subject matter discrimination. Suppose that the government decides to fund
projects, for the year, relating to the subject of American history. Suppose that any
museum is permitted to apply for funds, but no proposal will be considered unless it
relates to American history. This decision is constitutionally objectionable. The
government is not discriminating against any point of view. To be sure, it is favoring
material of a certain subject matter, and this step is more controversial than 2 above. But
a funding decision limited to a certain topic is unimpeachable.
This answer would be easiest to reach if the funding decision at issue was one of a
number of diverse decisions, as, for example, in a case in which one funding agency is
selective in one way (American history only), another is selective in another way (World
War II only), and yet another is selective in still another way (avant garde art). It would
be somewhat harder if the funding restriction were global – if, for example, no
government agency could fund art that did not relate to American history. In that case, it
would be possible to fear viewpoint discrimination, and here a sense of context should be
quite helpful.
3. “Pure” viewpoint discrimination. Suppose now that government engages in
unambiguous viewpoint discrimination. Suppose, for example, that it decides to fund
projects, for the year, relating to the subject of American history -- but it refuses to
consider any project that “casts America or its leaders in an unfavorable light.” This is a
harder case. At first glance, the refusal might seem plainly unconstitutional.
Discrimination on the basis of viewpoint is he core concern of the first amendment,
8 and
the policy at issue plainly embodies viewpoint discrimination. On the other hand,
government itself is perfectly entitled to speak in a viewpoint discriminatory way. If
government officials decide, during a period of national celebration, only to celebrate and
never to criticize, there would be no offense to the Constitution. Might not government
funding be seen as analogous to government speech? If so, might not government be
permitted to give funds only to programs of whose viewpoint it approves?
The Court’s puzzling and ambiguous decision in Rust v. Sullivan
9 seems to
support this conclusion. There the Court appeared to held that Congress could
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in the grant of funds to private organizations
engaged in family planning. More specifically, the Court said that Congress could require
that taxpayer funds will be devoted only to “projects” in which those engaged in family
planning do not counsel people about abortion, and do  not engage in lobbying,
dissemination of materials, and provision of speakers to increase the availability of
abortion. In upholding this funding limitation, the Court said that government “has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other,” and that its regulations
were intended “to ensure that the limits of the program are observed.” It added that when
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“Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other
countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required to fund a
program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as Communism and
Fascism.” For the Court, it was crucial that the case involved no penalty but a mere
failure to find. Here government “is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is simply
insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”
Taken on its own, Rust might seem to stand for the broad principle that
government can allocate its funds however it wishes, and hence that government can give
money to the causes that it favors, to promote governmentally preferred points of view. In
subsequent cases, however, the Court has raised serious questions about this reading of
Rust.  In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,
10 the Court struck
down a University of Virginia policy authorizing university subsidies of some student
publications, but forbidding subsidies for student publications that “primarily promote or
manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” The University
cited Rust, which appears strongly supportive of the selective subsidy. But the Court
distinguished and narrowed its prior decision, in such a way as to leave unsettled the
status of viewpoint discrimination in government funding.
The Court explained that government can “regulate the content of what is or is not
expressed [1] when it is the speaker or [2] when it enlists private entities to convey its
own message.” Thus Rust was merely a case in which the government “used private
speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.” This means that
a government appropriation of “public funds to promote a particular policy of its own”
can legitimately be accompanied by appropriate “steps to ensure that its message is
neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.” But it does not follow that government may
impose “viewpoint-based restrictions” when the government “does not itself speak or
subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers.” In this case, the University of Virginia did not
contend that those who were eligible for university support are the university’s agents;
student organizations “are not subject to its control and are not its responsibility.” Thus
when the university has decided to pay private speakers “who convey their own
messages,” it “may not silence the expression of selected viewpoints.”
There is obvious tension between  Rush and Rosenberger; and the implications of
the two cases, taken together, are far from clear. The distinction seems to be that in
Rosenberger, the university did not contend that it was attempting to “convey its own
message” or implement “its own program.” But what if the university said that its
funding policies involved “its own program,” broadly speaking? What if the university
denied that its purpose was “to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers”?
What if the university said that it sought to encourage diversity, but subject to certain
restrictions, on the ground that some funding decisions would create too much
entanglement between the state and religion? In any case Rosenberger could be
understood broadly or very narrowly, and as the opinion is written, it is not clear that it
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stands as a barrier to a government decision to refuse to fund art that it deems offensive,
even on the basis of viewpoint.
Compare in this regard the Court’s most sustained encounter with question of
government funding of the arts,  National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.
11 There the
Court was asked to assess a statute asking the NEA, in establishing procedures to assess
the artistic merit of applicants, to “take[e] into consideration general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.” The Court upheld
the statute against facial attack; but what is especially important here is what the Court
did not say. The Court did not conclude that government could give out taxpayers funds
however it chose. It did not accept a “strong” reading of Rust v. Sullivan, which would
allow government to choose, in its discretion, its preferred candidates for public
subsidization. Instead the Court found it necessary to emphasize that the statute at issue
was not, in fact, a form of viewpoint discrimination.
Thus the Court said that the considerations listed in the statute are “susceptible to
multiple interpretation,” and nothing in law was introduced that “in practice, would
effectively preclude or punish the expression of particular views.” Both the “decency”
and the “respect” criteria could be understood in a constitutional fashion, as, for example,
by attempting to give special consideration to “projects and productions . . . that reach, or
reflect the culture of, a minority, inner city, rural, or tribal community.”  Because artistic
funding was necessarily based on content discrimination, this case was not covered by
Rosenberger, which there was (what the Court called) an indiscriminate effort to
encourage a diversity of views from the private sphere. And the Court left open the
possibility that in particular cases, “the denial of a grant may be shown to be the product
of invidious viewpoint discrimination.” Thus any “penalty on disfavored viewpoints”
would present “a different case.” Justice Souter dissented on the ground that this was in
fact a form of viewpoint discrimination; Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
concurred in the result, invoking a strong reading of Rust and suggesting that government
may “earmark NEA funds for protects it deems to be in the public interest without
thereby abridging speech.”
It is not easy to reconstruct the law as constituted by Rust, Rosenberger, and
Finley. The strong version of Rust appears to have been rejected by the Court;
unambiguous viewpoint discrimination appears to be impermissible, even with respect to
the allocation of government funds for art. On the other hand, government may itself
speak as it wishes, and if government wants to create a “program” for a proposed point of
view, and to enlist private speakers in the endeavor, it is permitted to do exactly that.
Thus, for example, government might have a project for democracy, or a project for the
reduction of smoking among teenagers, and it might pay private speakers to help. It might
even be possible for government to have a special artistic project whose purpose is to
encourage (for example) celebration of the nation’s natural beauty. In such cases, Rust
would probably govern. But where the government is engaged in a general funding
process for art, it is unlikely to be permitted to discriminate on  the basis of viewpoint. Of
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course the distinction between a specific program and a general funding process is very
far from transparent.
4. Genre distinctions and temporal distinctions. Suppose that the government is
deciding which museums to fund; suppose too that it chooses to fund museums that offer
traditional art, rather than museums that specialize in avant-garde art. This is a somewhat
harder case than those discussed those far. The reason is that the line that is being drawn
is not merely based on subject matter (which would be acceptable), nor is it based purely
on viewpoint (which would be unacceptable). Many artistically informed observers
would think that a government distinction of this kind – traditional art yes, avant garde art
no -- encodes something more like viewpoint discrimination. Probably the best
conclusion is that since government is permitted to fund artistic work of a certain content,
it can favor work that fits within aesthetically preferred categories, so long as it is not
expressly discriminating against any point of view. If government is refusing to fund art
that is perceived to threaten existing government institutions, the argument for
invalidation is strengthened. And here too it matters whether the line is local or global.
5. Deference to taxpayers and their sensibilities. In many cases, including Finley
and Brooklyn Museum, government is likely to be refusing to fund projects out of
deference to the sensibilities – moral, aesthetic, and otherwise – of taxpayers. What is the
status of this deference?
Here the key question involves the content of the relevant taxpayer sensibilities. If
taxpayers are calling for viewpoint discrimination, the  case is no different from case (3)
above. If the government’s decision is based on the judgment that taxpayers would find
the relevant work “offensive to traditional morality,” the issue is a bit harder, because the
viewpoint discrimination is less obvious. But it seems reasonable to say that in such a
case, the government, acting at the behest of taxpayers, is attempting to entrench
traditional morality, and this is a form of viewpoint discrimination. This conclusion
shows why Finley was such a difficult case; the Court’s conclusion that the statutory
criteria showed content but not viewpoint discrimination seemed to be rooted in a
judgment that they were merely “factors” and did not require government to accept or
reject any particular position.
If the government is deferring to purely aesthetic judgments, it is likely to be on
firm ground. Here the analysis would be similar to that in 1, 2, and 4 above. If the
government chooses not to fund a show consisting of avant-garde art, the ground that
taxpayers would find the show “confusing” and “ugly,” it is probably acting
constitutionally, unless there is reason to suspect that something else is at work.
The upshot of this discussion is that deference to taxpayers should be analyzed
similarly to any other form of selective funding. What matters is the ground for the
selectivity.
6. Withdrawal of funds: A special case? Thus far all of  the cases have involved a
refusal to fund in the first instance, rather than a withdrawal of funds that have been10
promised. This case appears to fall between a mere failure to fund and an unambiguous
penalty. Suppose, for example, that government withdraws support from an exhibit that
turns out to have objectionable content; suppose too that no viewpoint discrimination is
involved. If this would be acceptable as a failure to fund in the first instance, would it be
objectionable if it is a withdrawal of funds already promised?
A more concrete illustration: The government has decided to fund a series of
museums. It withdraws funding from several shows of avant garde art. If the government
withdraws funding from the museum in general, there is an unambiguous penalty, and the
action is unconstitutional. If the government had refused to fund in the first instance,
there would be (by hypothesis) no constitutional problem, But suppose that the
withdrawal is a genuine withdrawal, not an initial failure to fund, and suppose too that it
does not involve general defunding of the museum, but is limited to the shows that were
receiving the relevant funding. Is the withdrawal of funds worse than a refusal to fund in
the first instance?
It might seem plausible to think that it is. A withdrawal of funds might well offer
better evidence of an illicit government motive. When a selective funding agency refuses
to give out resources in the first instance, its decision may be based on any number of
grounds. And when funds are withdrawn, the case might seem closer to a penalty rather
than a refusal to fund.  In the case of withdrawn funds, it might seem sensible to say:
Here the government is deciding to eliminate a benefit that it would otherwise confer,
merely because of the exercise of a constitutional right. But this seems to be little more
than a form of wordplay. Unless there really is grounds to believe an illicit motive is at
work, and unless there is a penalty in the sense described in Part II above, a withdrawal
should probably be treated the same as a failure to fund.
IV. Three Puzzles and A Conclusion
My purpose in this Essay has been largely descriptive. I have attempted a
sympathetic reconstruction of existing law, designed to show some coherence and order,
and to generate answers to most of the disputed questions. Notwithstanding the evident
order of most of the law, some serious difficulties remain. Consider just three points:
·  It is not clear that the distinction between viewpoint discrimination and content
discrimination is always coherent, especially in the area of arts funding. At the
very  least, many forms of content discrimination might be seen (so to speak) as
forms of viewpoint discrimination. Suppose, for example, that government has
decided that it will not fund avant garde art, or that it wants to restrict the art that
it subsidizes to material dealing with American culture. Would we not suspect
that these lines embed a form of implicit viewpoint discrimination? Even without
such suspicion, might we not think that any such distinction explicitly depends, in
one way or another, on a certain viewpoint, embodying judgments about other
viewpoints?11
·  The line between a penalty and a refusal to fund is far from secure. Whether there
is a penalty depends on specification of the normal state of affairs, and when
government is frequently involved in funding the arts, identification of the normal
state of affairs may be quite unclear. Suppose, for example, that government
refuses to fund an exhibit, because that exhibit contains art of which the
government disapproves. Why oughn’t we to say that the museum is not receiving
resources to which it would “otherwise” be entitled, that is, to which it would be
entitled if not for its presentation of governmentally disfavored art? The question
suggests that many “mere” failures to fund could as well be seen as “penalties.”
Probably the best solution is to acknowledge the point but to insist that some
forms of content discrimination are inevitable so long as government is funding at
all. But this solution does not dissipate the difficulty of making the distinction, in
principle, between penalizing and failing to fund.
·  The Court’s decisions in Rust, Rosenberger, and Finley do not suggest anything
like a straightforward line between permitted and prohibited arts funding. The
special problem is in figuring out whether there is a special program (where
selective funding is fine, even if based on viewpoint) or a general set of grants
(where viewpoint discrimination is banned). Apparently government is not
permitted to make this decision on its own, but it is not clear why, and it is not
clear when the government’s characterization will be found unacceptable.
These are difficult questions; but it is nonetheless possible to identify principles to
resolve the bulk of imaginable problems. Government cannot impose criminal or civil
sanctions on speech, outside of a few narrow categories of cases. The analysis of
“penalties” proceeds in the same way. If people would otherwise have been entitled to
government benefits, the benefits cannot be denied on the ground that people have
engaged in speech that is not independently regulable under the first amendment.
The hardest cases involve selective funding decisions, where government is
engaging in what it attempts to categorize as a “mere” failure to fund. If government is
refusing to fund material for content-neutral reasons, there is most unlikely to be a
constitutional objection. If government is refusing to fund material because of a
preference for a certain subject matter,  there is no constitutional problem, unless the
subject matter distinction is suggestive of viewpoint discrimination. Arts funding that
involves viewpoint discrimination is forbidden, even if there is a “mere” failure to
provide resources – at least outside of contexts in which government explicitly and self-
consciously adopts a specific program to encourage a specific point of view. These
conclusions leave many open questions, but they create a framework with which to
resolve most real-world disputes, and also to begin inquiries, both practical and
theoretical, about the most troublesome cases.12
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